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Abstract
Tom G. K. Bryce and Stephen P. Day’s (2013) original article on scepticism and doubt in science education explores the context of citizens’ attitudes towards the complexities and uncertainties of global issues, namely global warming. This response aims to stimulate reflection on some of the implicit assumptions underpinning the relationships between science, technology and the public.  I argue that an underestimation of the political and ethical dimensions of science and technology limits the possibilities for education to set the agenda for citizens’ participation in science and technological matters.  Drawing on Sheila Jasanoff’s model of co-production, this paper proposes a radical re-affirmation of the aims and purposes of science education to embrace a multiplicity of disciplines, narratives and ways of knowing in science, technology and society issues. 
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In the article “Scepticism and doubt in science and science education: the complexity of global warming as a socio-scientific issue”, Bryce and Day venture in the contested terrain of what constitutes valuable scientific literacy in the face of complex and controversial socio-scientific issues.  The authors conceive of a scientific education aimed at giving students the skills to understand how evidence is produced in socio-scientific issues; such skills are part of a set of reasoning competences developed in social settings that citizens should use to respond effectively to the confusion, sensationalism and scare-stories surrounding science and technology. In other words, a scientifically literate citizen confronted by a socio-scientific issue does not retract from but engages with the social and political influences affecting the production and communication of scientific knowledge. 
Such critical stance is defined by the authors as the development of a ‘sceptical attitude’ and the authors are at pains to state that a distinction exists between rational scepticism and the pejorative expression associated with attitudinal opposition. Drawing on the earlier works of Bauer (2006), a position of ‘micro-skepticism’ is defined by Bryce and Day as a reasoning disposition (my italics) by virtue of which: “the science teacher’s focus should be as a ‘hypothesis tester’ where he/she helps students to weigh-up competing/conflicting evidence”. This also means that they need to come to a view about what constitutes worthwhile evidence” (Bryce and Day 2013).  School science education would thus serve the interests of citizens by promoting competencies such as the exertion of critical judgement towards contested issues affecting the environment and society such as climate. 
In this forum I would like to start from the proposition offered by Bryce and Day as a fertile opportunity to further the discussion on the aims of school science education, starting from the contract that is established - wittingly or unwittingly - between school science education and society. Two main sets of considerations  were stimulated by the article offered by Bryce and Day: the first reflection concerns  the nature of science and technological developments in mediating our relationship with other people and the natural systems; I will draw on the suggestions offered by Sheila Jasanoff’s idea of co-production of science and technology in society: “the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” (Jasanoff 2004, p.2). In this view, knowledge is inseparable from action and context and the community of science is included within a much broader community of human and non- human forms that is the Planet, as a whole.   The second set of considerations is related to the challenges and opportunities for science education to support the development of a transformative citizenship (Hung 2010) that is aware of the Planet as a shared place for all to inhabit. I argue that such awareness is key to framing the way in which citizens are involved in socio-scientific issues. 
The changing role and expectations of science as a privileged form of knowledge production
Human life as we currently know it in today’s urbanised, fast-paced, technological world is a life that has been shaped by the extraordinary development and applications of scientific ideas, knowledge and technological inventions. The 21st century is without a doubt the century of science and technology as much as our societal systems depend on techno-scientific innovation. An image of science as a privileged form of knowledge, superior to other ways of knowing in fulfilling the promise of progress and emancipation of mankind drives Governments’ agendas, the research funding streams and policy evaluation systems (Söderbaum and Brown 2010). Scientific innovation is sought as a means to solve problems and generate wealth and revenues; at the same time however, signs of discontent, fear and mistrust in relation to science and technology have become manifested in different quarters of society. 
The scientific enterprise has provided humanity with the knowledge and tools for shaping the natural environment to satisfy vital needs. It can hardly be contested that science and technology have been extremely successful at enabling human beings to exert some control over a multi-faceted, changeable and unpredictable environment. Over time the command over the flows of energy and matter in the natural systems to serve human concerns has turned into a pervasive power of transformation of the natural environments with local and global impacts on people and communities and often with unpredictable results.  
It is through the credibility and trust established by the scientific activity that much of such progress took place.  In describing the procedures adopted within the scientific community to validate its activity, the sociologist R. K. Merton referred to the scientific attitude as a form of “organized skepticism” through which research would lead to results that could be trusted.  Through a set of codes of conduct emphasising objectivity and public accountability, scientific knowledge was deemed to speak truth to power. In this fashion, the enterprise of science has continued to grow and today, much public money is invested in science and significant economic and social consequences may come from getting the science right (Jasanoff 2012).  However, in the face of  environmental issues such as climate change (amongst many others)  the mythical image of a climate science deployed to provide truth is challenged by a multiplicity of conflicting interpretations, mistakes and also allegations of bad practice. This state of affairs poses some challenges to conventional procedures of scientific validation and raises important questions about democracy. Crucially however questions are being asked if science as a form of knowledge is meeting the challenges posed by sustainability and the new demands posed by society (Barth and Michelsen 2013). 
This is an important demand for public governance and a task for education. 
Science will always be reductionist
Insightfully, it was Paul Feyerabend that in an essay published at the beginning of the seventies maintained: 
“the history of science, after all, does not just consist of facts and conclusions drawn from facts (…). We even find that science knows no ‘bare facts’ at all but that the ‘facts’ that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, essentially ideational” (Feyerabend 1975, p. 11). 
This being the case, the history of science has shown to be constellated by diversity, contradiction and multiplicity such is the nature of human thought and experience. How we have come to believe it to be otherwise however can be traced to an irresistible tendency to “simplify the medium in which a scientist works by simplifying its main actors” (p.11). 
In the first instance as Feyerabend describes, a domain of research is defined by means of clearly delineated disciplinary boundaries. Then, the disciplinary domain is further separated from other realms of knowledge (e.g. physics is separated both from philosophy and from theology) by means of a particular language, modus operandi and accepted actions of those operating in that particular domain. While it is recognised that much of the life of a scientist can be crucial in informing and shaping the choice of the domain and the facts that come to be defined, such knowledge hardly makes the headlines. Feyerabend continues: 
“his imagination [of the scientist] is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own. This is again reflected in the nature of scientific ‘facts’ which are experienced as being independent of opinion, belief, and cultural background” (p.11). 
In such manner, as reported by Kiyashchenko (2011), the Mertonian ideals of a  community of science as made by open-minded individuals dedicated to the development of humanity are taken to be the yardsticks through which to measure the purity of the facts of science.
Describing the world through variables
Through the interesting and articulated history of the climate gate controversy provided by Bryce and Day a recurrent theme appears; it is the ‘evidence’ provided by scientists; how the evidence was collected and presented (e.g. the choice of apparatuses, the data visualisation strategies) and how it was communicated and used to preserve the reputation of particular research groups. That the debates surrounding socio-scientific issues are focussed on evidence is hardly a point of criticism. After all, western science is based on the collection of empirical to support the identification of phenomena and the development of theoretical formulations. From an educational point of view, familiarising with the collection and presentation of evidence is clearly a key step in becoming scientific literate. 
So data and evidence are important. More recently, in referring to numerical evidence, Engelman (2013) underlines that ‘metrics matter’: “if we are to manage our way to a sound environment and a durable civilization, we’ll need to weight rigorously our progress in ways scientists can support and the rest of us agree on” (p. 17). We are currently gathering a growing amount of evidence documenting the important transformations of the global natural stocks and material flows. The cloud of data of any sort is expanding supported by the increasing capacity of modern computers for handling and storing data. The presumed neutrality and universality of science is supported by the act of objectification which provide a ’scientifically accurate’ picture of the situation. However while data and evidence are collected, assembled and managed in different ways, sometimes with conflicting interpretations, the explosion of measures is evidently failing to capture the complexity of real-life contexts, due to a fragmented, analytical view. 
In a recent contribution by Baker et al. (2013) the process of scientific description is illustrated in the making of a map of a forest landscape.  In order to produce the map, key variables were used to identify, select and label portions of reality by extracting them from a context. The result was a neat description, with the landscape dissected through the lenses of a specific set of disciplines.  The map was a form of useful knowledge too, yet almost necessarily avoiding “hybrid forms of diversity created by cycles, intersections, and overlaps and lived experiences” (Baker et al. 2013, p. 2501).  In this specific example, the persistent epistemological divide in the environmental community that separated agricultural landscapes from forest landscapes translated into both the choices of methods and the axiological assumptions: “many subjective values are contained within the map’s classification system and the narrative it circulates” (Baker et al. 2013, p. 5).  The important implication that stems from this illustration is the recognition that evidence which may be shortcoming or weak, is always dependent upon the frame constructed by a specific knowledge system (in this case, a branch of environmental science).  With respect to Western science, what we recognise is the irreducible tendency of scientific rationalism to bring the problem down to manageable elements, that is, to reduce, by means of deliberate, methodological and linguistic strategies (Martinez-Alier 2009). Reductionism of science is a sociological and cultural phenomenon as much as a method in itself. According to Bateson “The continuum of nature is constantly broken down into a discontinuum of variables in the act of description” (p. 165).  
So the climate gate controversy is fixed upon the embracing or discounting of the evidence being presented. Much is at stake from this set of circumstances as Government and knowledge institutions around the world make decisions under increasing pressures and competing goals (e.g. economic and technological development are seen to be in contrast with precaution and resource conservation). On the basis of the available evidence, beneficial gains are weighed up against a certain number of inevitable losses (Hornborg 2009) and the balance between the costs and the benefits is expected to inform the outcome of a particular decision. Yet it becomes apparent that establishing what counts as good evidence or good science is only a very small part in the process of addressing what science is good for and for whom. In this process, the definition of the specific costs and benefits may vary greatly depending on the variables which are used by different disciplines (e.g. monetary values, chemical indicators, geographical extension, people or groups involved and so on). Each discipline would look at the same issue from a multiplicity of different frames of reference, that is, each discipline will have its own sets of internal rules to establish what facts may be relevant and worthy of consideration. We are also reminded of the on-going discussions around the possibility or even necessity to attach economic value for example to natural system services in order to be able to compare and assess what may be very different and incommensurable types of costs (Douguet, O’Connor and Noel 2008). In this regard, a recent contribution by Thomas Hak, Bedrich Moldan and Arthur Lyon Dahl (2012) on the topic of risk points to the incredible paradox that characterise modern scientific tools: “we have had considerable success in building measurement tools but less in knowing how to use them, or for what ends”. With this statement comes the acknowledgment of bringing an element of humility in the recognition of the limitations of rationalist approach and acquiring wisdom as to when the use of increasingly powerful tools is appropriate. Skepticism is indeed growing about the effectiveness of techno-science to respond to the unintended and unforeseen consequences of human pressure on the Earth ecosystems. As reported by Gabrys and Yusoff (2012) speculating on which thresholds to observe or avoid and anticipating which humans and nonhumans will most severely experience the impacts is a formidable task; not something that can be easily settled or resolved but it is a situation of great contingency, complexity and uncertainty, involving political, ethical and ecological concerns. The sustainability of human life on Earth is not simply a matter of good interpretation of data but it is fundamentally an ethical challenge. So how could the belief in the neutrality and objectivity of the scientific approach be reconciled with the acknowledgement of an unavoidable ‘value component”? 
Introducing alternative grounds of vision
On the basis of the reflections offered by Feyerabend about the classical method of knowledge production in science, a scientific approach to the question would focus on the discussion of the evidence that is available, the methods used for collecting it and its validity in relation to a specific field. An issue is controversial on the basis of a lack of convergent, scientific evidence. 
When discussing controversies such as climate change however the evidence we refer to is a. often largely trespassing the boundaries of a number of different disciplinary fields and b. it is related to the impacts of a particular intervention either on people or the environment. At this point an interesting transition occurs from thinking about scientific knowledge as something theoretical and abstract to recognising that such knowledge is deeply enmeshed with action. For example, when discussing the impact of a particular intervention in a water network system such as the building of a dam, we are concerned with what a dam is as well as what the dam can do according to particular objectives, e.g. how much water can be retained; how much energy can be produced over a period of time. The dam is a theoretical idea, a project on paper, as much as it is a tangible construction in the environment with a number of qualitative and quantitative inter-linkages (i.e. with the rivers; the rainfalls; the fauna etc.) and tangible effects. 
It is often taken for granted however that a distinct temporal space exists between an idea and their institutional expression, i.e. first think or speak, and then build or modify. As Feyerabend reminds us: “creation of a thing and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop” (p. 17). Such interconnection between thinking and doing has been articulated and further expanded by a number of other scholars from the field of psychology of the early years, language, art, architecture, anthropology, sociology as well as science and technology studies. The idea of a fixed rationality can only be accepted by a very simple and naïve understanding of man and his social surrounding. As human beings we learn through interaction with other people and the environment (Kontra, Goldin-Meadow and Beilock 2012); the experiences we have are mediated by our bodies and language and are available in the memory, thus contributing to future learning and future actions (Bateson 1980). By virtue of such interactions our knowledge systems and cultures have grown with a diversification of approaches and ideas to respond to similar, common needs. 
An important implication of this state of things is to consider a broader focus concerned with the role of the cultural and political sphere in the analysis of an issue.  An issue may be controversial at the level of epistemic reasoning, that is, when the evidence does not converge. However such evidence derives from an enterprise that has been legitimated by the existing framework of political agendas, regulations and societal customs and relations.   Values are hard-wired into the very fabric of society and decision-making procedures by virtue of which particular projects – and thus particular types of knowledge – are conceived and advanced. So an issue can be focussed on the facts as well as on the values. If doubt is held with respect to the knowledge we currently hold a critical interrogation of the origins of such knowledge is in order. 
Describing versus inhabiting the environment
The environmental conservation literature has debated widely the nature of conflicting interests held by different users of natural ecosystem services (Redpath et al. 2013). Within an area with diminishing resources, systems of measuring capacity for example are taken as a means for assessing differential impacts for different activities. In the realm of socio-environmental metric therefore a large development has been observed in the field of economic, environmental and social indicators. Over time, indicators have come to incorporate measures of economic development with the uses of land (e.g. ecological footprint) and human well-being (Contu and Camino 2013). What often does not transpire however, when thinking about knowledge in science, is the existential dimension, that is, the worlds that people inhabit. Such worlds form the grounds for the derivation of very different types of knowledge, driven by different purposes and preoccupations and orientated by particular worldviews.  
Drawing on the contributions offered by anthropology, to inhabit or to dwell in an environment is a process that involves the cultural as well as the biophysical dimension (Ingold 2004). The way we travel through the environment and we orient ourselves in space and in time leads to fundamentally different experiences for different people. A pertinent example is provided by Leidler (2006) describing the knowledge held by Inuit people about the relationship between sea ice and climate change. Such knowledge brings together relationships among physical, temporal and biological dimensions of a place (e.g. the thickness of the ice is seen in relation with the seasons and the availability of particular wildlife). Leidler (2006) goes on to suggest that commonalities can be found between the concerns of the scientists and the concerns of local people. For example, the thickness of the ice is an aspect of common observation. Similarly, activities of forecasting and prediction feature in both knowledge systems. However the purposes are very different for in the case of the Inuit populations knowing the environment is equated to being able to survive in it, hence requiring a close and sustained relationship with the surroundings. This approach is based on a deep awareness of the human dependence on natural systems, on the need to adapt and to develop resilience to ever changing conditions and the awareness of the interdependence of all living forms. If the response of the western scientific description has been that of quantifying the world into a few variables for the purpose of predicting and controlling environmental effects (including climatic events) the response of indigenous knowledge has been that of perceiving the continuum of nature and working with it.  
This is particularly more important as we observe that much of current scientific and technological advances are deliberately altering long-established evolutionary and ecological relationships that bring together human beings with the Earth and fellow life forms. In biotechnology for example, this type of research occurs as it develops biotechnological products in action (that is, by observing directly the life cycle and opportunities for survival of particular organisms) while venturing into domains for which no prior knowledge or experience is available (Elowitz and Wendell 2010). Similarly, climate science is a branch of knowledge that has acquired significance in the face of fundamental changes in the metabolism of the natural systems (Clark and York 2005) with unknown and possibly unknowable effects. Indeed as reported in a review offered by Benessia and Funtowicz (2013) the coming together of the engineering approaches with the skills and expertise of molecular biologists scientists have come to propose a real possibility  - unknown before now - that life on earth can be replaced by entirely new, technological artefacts (Solow 1973). This idea can be traced through time within the belief that technology would supply for the shortcomings of Nature and solve the problems of humanity (STOA 2011). It is not difficult to trace parallels with current technological solutions on climate change whereby deliberate, large-scale interventions in the climate system are designed to offset some of the effects by reconfiguring the solar energy budget in the biosphere. Geo-engineering is proposed as being easier than regulation (Michaelson 1998), while China has listed Geo-engineering as one of the priorities for Earth Sciences research agenda (Hamilton 2013). In so doing, the scientific and technological enterprise - supported by the political and financial spheres - is not simply providing solutions, raising preoccupations or giving evidence for political decisions, but it is effectively posing itself as a narrative for the future, based on the techno-scientific imagination of unstoppable human progress. “Natural limits are simply obstacles that capital attempts to transcend or work around” (Clark and York 2005). Such visions however affect the way in which human beings relate with the governing institutions, the infrastructures, other fellow human beings and with the natural systems which are implicitly or explicitly excluded with the definition we adopt to refer to ‘us’: in essence, it is the complexity of the ways in which we relate with the environment and with one another. 
The existence of different types of knowledge can be understood as part of the very different ways in which we share in with the webs of relationships and the energy, matter and information flows within the ecosystems. Values hold ties with differential sets of material and tangible expressions in the environment. Allowing for a multiplicity of values to exist therefore does not simply equate to anything goes. Rather, the shaping of the material flows of exchanges that occur within the environment is a responsibility affecting people globally within a Planet that is both bounded and finite. This state of affairs brings us to the acknowledgement that the focus of the debate will not simply be on the nature of the evidence about the effects of any particular technological intervention (e.g. the carbon emissions of biomass as opposed to renewable energies) but on the values of participation and inclusion, at different levels within the system, from civic and political structures to the biospheric realm which accommodates a diversity of life forms and living projects.  
Many authors have been committed to developing a critical stance towards the Western imaginary and power narratives (Jasanoff 2013) and argue for better awareness of the need to engage in development paths that are more respectful of the views and rights of all parties, including the natural systems hosting us. This argument will require some serious consideration of our own personal attitude towards the ideas of uncertainty and diversity for which education has much to account for.  For people recognising the shortcomings of an allegedly elected knowledge system, skepticism could be accompanied by humility and the desire to learn from other experiences and cultures. Arguably it may well be that it is democracy and pluralism that would serve science and technology better than it is currently observed.                                                                                                                                           
Behind the opposite sides of the ‘worries’ and ‘deniers’ issues of governance are hidden. 
 In their article Bryce and Day lament that the current polarization of the debate on the two fronts of the ‘worries’ and the ‘deniers’ is most unhelpful; a more rational attitude should be encouraged to move the debate forward and towards some  form of resolution. Within the realm of scientific rationality however consensus can only be obtained by closure.  As reported by Hulme (2011), the field is dominated by quantitative, predictive modelling, that he calls “climate reductionism” or “neo-environmental determinism” pushing to anchor the debate around specific time-frames and sets of variables.  Within the framework I have referred to as ‘narrow focus’ - according to which decisions will be based on the tools made available through scientific research – diversity is perceived as a hindrance and uncertainty is being managed.   With the adoption of numerical language in the quantification of risks, in fact, often comes an apparent sense of certainty (Perrow 1984). Such quantifications however may obscure dimensions of the problem that are not easily quantifiable, even if they bear important consequences for the public. The methods used for assessing many biological and chemical products (pesticides, additives, drugs, GMOs) have clearly shown the limitations of the numbers for elaborating future scenarios. 
In this view, and as indicated by a group of commentators including Dan Kahan (2012) and Bruno Latour (2004) amongst others, issues of discontent, disaffection as manifested by the two sides – the worries and the deniers  in relation to climate change - should not be seen as manifestations of public irrationalism. Rather, they need to be seen as expressions of scientific belief or disbelief. What we are confronted by when looking at the issue is the existence of divisive cultural meanings related to the legitimacy of scientific evidence as a privileged way of knowing and informing future actions. What we are observing however is the impossibility to settle an issue which is simply escaping the boundaries of scientific rationalism​[1]​. In addition, if perhaps less obvious, is the existence of alternative and unspoken assumptions about progress and ethical rigour shaping the course and conduct of science and technology.  Beyond the specific events of the climate gate, comparative studies in the history of environmental conservation such as the example given earlier about map making (Baker et al. 2013) have shown the co-existence of numerical descriptions with the promotion of particular narratives, depicting reality through subjectivity and beliefs rather than pure and settled certainties (Dahlstrom and Ho 2012). 
In another context, through comparison of regulatory systems deployed in different countries,  Jasanoff (2005) powerfully uncovered significant convergences and divergences between different nations​[2]​ with respect to the official Governmental position and the specific political instruments used (i.e. modification of existing laws or new legislation) on controversial matters. Such examples brings back the ancient debates on what is considered to be right or wrong, the institutional practices and the relationships that should be established between citizens and the State. In fact the ways in which the different nations have framed the questions that derive from emerging techno-scientific innovations, establish priorities and resolve the political and ethical problems that derive from them are profoundly shaped by history and local contexts. The challenge of making wise decisions in the face of uncertainty lies at the interface between ethics, politics and science. 
 In this vein Bruno Latour (2004) suggested to move beyond the realm of evidence and to engage with the inherent seriousness of climate change as a real, occurring phenomenon. Beyond the plethora of voices around evidence, there are in fact responsibilities and actions for all to be considered in relation to environmental change.  Indeed Latour’s critique becomes important in the extent to which it shifts the debate from the idea that a definite consensus ought to be reached based on the correct, scientific knowledge to the idea that people should engage with matters of common concern. Other scholars in the past, and including scientists also, such as Konrad Lorenz and starkly, Jacques Monod have put forward a similar position towards the relationship between science and society: “Cold and austere, proposing no explanation but imposing an ascetic renunciation of all other spiritual fare [the idea that objective knowledge is the only real means to truth] was not of a kind to allay anxiety but aggravated it instead” (Monod 1972, p. 169). The debate would thus shift further into the question of democracy requiring citizens to engage with science and technology as a site of legitimization and political action (Ninan 2009).  
If climate modelling is presenting views of temperature fluctuations and seasonal patterns, the life of a citizen in everyday interactions is made up of choices in a multi-faceted set of conditions, localities and concerns – from food choices, to communication systems and transport, all such decisions and actions are linked to history, place and are not value-free. Rather as reported by Ninan (2009) ‘moral values are always attached to every article exposed for sale in the market’ (p. 190). Consequently, artefacts can have politics as they are embedded within particular forms of social and political organisation. In this view, citizens’ response to climate change involves actions and choices of individuals which have relevance for the entire community, both at the local and global scale and refer to the nature of the relationships we establish with one another depending on the choices we make with respect to the ways we arrange our time, our space, the choices that we make when we travel, eat or attend to one another. In this regard, contextualised experiences may take prominence over simplification to variables and become significant elements of one’s experience; the individual, private and embodied difference is irreducible to building citizenship (Hung 2010). Citizenship is to be found in the idiosyncratic set of feelings, emotions and imaginations that make for our life on the ground. 

As reported by Gabrys and Yusoff (2012): 
“Climate science is not a matter of purified inquiry into environmental systems, and climate change is most potent in the uncertainty of its effects. In this respect, climate sciences may require ever more sophisticated integration with complex, natural-cultural and political systems” (p. 19). 
This may imply disengaging from scientific and technological prediction and accepting that such future may only be knowable to the extent to which citizens contribute to shaping its course. At stake are the future trajectories harboured in the hearts and minds of people living in a society. 
What agendas for science education in schools? 
In this context the role of schools needs to be interrogated. In the realm of education the acts of reductionism and simplification of the context of scientific research and identity of the scientists are well documented. Stereotypical images of scientist are perpetuated (Losh, Wilke and Pop 2007) alongside a naïve view of science as a body of factual knowledge. When confronted with socio-scientific issues then it is common to find people grappling with the idea of ‘getting the facts right’ for science must have the solution; it is society that tampers with it (Longino 2002). 
Arguably however formal schooling has always been one of the most powerful tools for transferring dominant forms of knowledge and values through enculturation and colonisation (Fielding 2004). From the social stratification of schools through to the persistent emphasis on canonical knowledge and routine procedures, scientific reductionism as a method as well as a cultural mindset has come to permeate the modes of knowledge production and decision-making processes at all levels in society. The resulting expectation is that expert knowledge is the answer to the solution of societal problems (an idea which is well documented in the literature, see for example Aikenhead 2006). 
By operating within the boundaries of scientific reductionism we are prevented from acknowledging that socio-scientific issues are indeed rooted into the fabric of values, beliefs, hierarchies and laws of a society. Hence school science education has something to account for the sense of defeat, surprise and puzzlement shown by students and teachers alike towards socio-scientific controversies.  Most importantly however and as it was also indicated by Levinson (2012) in another forum on this journal, school science education has contributed to promoting the idea of a science and technology that equipped with technical expertise and political support would take charge of societal models of development. At no point the possibility that other choices, courses of actions, voices and uncertainties might exist would feature in conventional scientific education. 
Returning to the focus of this article, the discussion advanced so far has outlined the difference between a narrow focus on the evidence produced by scientists and a broader focus exploring further the social and cultural influences underpinning the existence of the scientific enterprise. In both cases, a clear link exists between knowledge and power. However in one scenario, it is the knowledge of science that should inform decisions; in the other case, fundamental questions about ways of seeing the world and living are brought into consideration. To return to the specific issue of climate change, an awareness of these two different ways of approaching socio-scientific controversies would enable us to frame the debate within some broader signposts and themes concerned with our attitudes and perceptions of scientific innovation. The issue of climate change in fact is only apparently rooted in the rising levels of CO2 and the changes of temperature. What lies beneath the debate is the complexity of the climate systems and the narrative to which, as humanity, we intend to subscribe. As indicated earlier, different choices in terms of technological innovation would ultimately affect the relationships we hold with the people in power, the infrastructures and with each other. A narrative of power will aim to replace complexity within a framework of increasing technological development, speed, centralised control and economic growth. A narrative of inclusion and democracy will seek to respond to issues of well-being, restoration of trust and mutual responsibility. Given the interrelated nature of technological innovation, politics and the lives of people I propose that a move beyond evidence is important and necessary. 
I welcome Bryce and Day’s suggestion for the development of a sceptical attitude. With this aim in mind, their choice of pedagogical approach based on cooperative learning enables pupils to practice with discussion, sharing knowledge, ways of talking, discourses and values.  Within the context of a society which is called to take responsibility for its techno-scientific enterprise, the development of a range of competences for discussion of contrasting views is absolutely necessary. It is indeed through discussion that one can develop meta-reflection about the origins, nature and uses of scientific evidence. In such conditions students as citizens can make use of the space offered by schools to renegotiate their social power:  they are not simply the consumers who may trust or not trust the quality of the knowledge they are given. They can become critics of that knowledge by means of new and more complex mental models leading to higher stages of consciousness (Barth and Michelsen 2012).  A Kantian model of liberal education based on the rational autonomy of the single individual appears to align with this idea. Within a process that emphasises democratic interaction then citizens can bring forth qualities of informed judgement in relation to science and technology. 
Equally however, in the light of the reflections regarding the multi-levelled nature of controversial issues, I suggest that the remit of science education should be expanded even further beyond the development of a sceptical attitude. Since the publication of Uri Beck’s “Risk society” we have witnessed a change in the type of issues upon which we have been called upon to decide. Apparently localised, specific environmental issues such as rivers pollution, waste recycling, power lines have been subsumed by the rise of global issues which are confronting society as a whole. With the change of scale we can also observe a change in the intensity and extension of the risk: issues of energy availability, food, soil and water are worldwide phenomena, impacting on the fulfilment of people’s basic, fundamental needs. In this context, a sceptical attitude and a form of education based on cooperation can go some way towards enabling citizens to critically appraise technological innovation; such appraisal however will be more profoundly rooted into praxis, that is, into the historicised, biophysical and reciprocal nature of people’s actions.  Some guiding reflections on this kind of education may be found in the works of Hannah Arendt. For Arendt, subjectivity starts in relation with the other: “in order to act, in order to be a subject, we need others who respond to our beginnings” (Biesta 2006, p. 133). The fundamental implication of this position is thus that the essential condition for subjectivity and for action to exist is plurality. Erasing the diversity of the other not only eliminates the possibility for others to act but it automatically erase one’s possibility to come into the world and being a subject.                                                                                                       
Schools can thus become integral and active component of a framework of co-production in science technology, society studies if citizens with their actions can contribute to negotiating and shaping the values of science and technology to increase the opportunities for people to act and to be subjects. The type of education I am proposing is aimed at the development of personal and collective awareness of how relationships with other people are being established; it goes beyond the acquisition of communicative skills aimed at finding consensus or resolutions; rather it tackles the very process of communication as a relational process in which people are enabled to or prevented from expressing diversity, becoming subjects and make shared worlds viable. In this view, communication as a relational activity stretches beyond words and signs, to include the  impacts  of ways of eating, travelling, devoting our time as aspects of a broader scenario that includes us in relation to other living beings. Such competencies are multifaceted and ranging from linguistic, emotional, reflective and creative abilities aimed at increasing the opportunities for inclusion.            Thus schools that are equipped for this kind of education can become an important place for the ‘interruption of the performance of the narratives of power”; schools can offer moments in the lives of the students in which to recognise other forms of knowing, reuniting the psychological with the   relational, emotional and spiritual sphere. As proposed by Jasanoff (2013):                                               
  “To govern ourselves well as a democratic society we have less of a need for calculation than of a series of attitudes: a position towards the future which is more liberal than authoritarian, more inclusive than exclusive and more humble than arrogant” (Jasanoff, p. 53).                                                
I invite the authors and readers in this forum to discuss the extent to which our curricula and practices in science education are prepared for this task.                                                                                                                   
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^1	  At the time of completing this article - it is the 11 of July 2013 – the BBC is showing footage of flooding in China, in the region Setzchuan. The waters are carrying away entire buildings, crumbling and disappearing from sight like sandcastles on the shore.  Such images throw up concerns for an extended community of peers examining multiple necessities for action at multiple time-scales. 
^2	  In the study, Jasanoff considers policy regulation with respect to GMOs, Stem Cells, Intellectual Property rights and bioethics in the United States, United Kingdom and Germany. For example as reported by the author while human embryos are considered the precursors of life and great respect is given to them, in the United kingdom a distinction is made between the human embryo that is less than 14 days old and the ones at more advanced stages of development, whereas in Germany such distinction does not exist.
